Income distribution in the Public Goods Game: An experimental analogue of peculation

Authors

  • André Luiz Ferreira Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar)
  • Giovana Escobal Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar)
  • Celso Goyos Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31505/rbtcc.v23i1.1466

Keywords:

Corruption, Behaviour Analysis, Game Theory, Public Goods Game

Abstract

Corruption has been the object of study in much research, but only recently have begun to investigate it experimentally. One way to study this phenomenon is to expose the participants in a Public Goods Game (PGG) in which they need to contribute to producing a particular public good, and then need to make decisions about how this good will be distributed among all the participants. A participant who makes distributions unequally for his own benefit shall behave in a manner analogous to that described in the crime of peculation. The aim of this study was to investigate how the participants distributed public resources in the PGG. Six participants were exposed to the procedure. Five participants made unequal distributions, i.e., they allocated most of the resources to themselves. From these results, we suggest changes in the contingencies that control the occurrence of this type of behaviour.

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Published

2022-12-19

How to Cite

Ferreira, A. L., Escobal, G., & Goyos, C. (2022). Income distribution in the Public Goods Game: An experimental analogue of peculation. Brazilian Journal of Behavioral and Cognitive Therapy, 23(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.31505/rbtcc.v23i1.1466

Issue

Section

Special section: Behavior Analysis, Game theory and behavioral economics